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Men’s actions are subject to general, immutable laws expressed by 
statistics.  In what, then, consists man’s responsibility before society, 
the concept of which follows from the consciousness of man’s 
freedom?  That is a question for jurisprudence.1 
—Leo Tolstoy 
 
Freedom and statistical certainty make for tense bedfellows, as Leo Tolstoy 
gamely noted in his ambitious epilogue to War and Peace.2  As science 
progresses in understanding the world of action and reaction, the justice system, 
rooted in theories of punishment as old as human civilization, must be analyzed 
continuously in light of new scientific reality.  A collision that threatens to rock 
our criminal system of justice looms as a stark possibility: how do we square a 
deterministic account of human behavior—one in which every person’s actions 
are foreordained and unchangeable—with a criminal system that holds people 
accountable for their crimes? 
In August 2012, the journal Science plumbed this problem directly when it 
published a study documenting the sentences imposed by 181 state court judges 
confronted at the sentencing stage of a hypothetical criminal proceeding with 
evidence of biomechanical predisposition to psychopathy.3  The judges faced 
the case of a convicted murderer who argued that his genetic makeup 
                                                 
 Litigation Associate, Venable LLP.  Formerly a trial attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice, 
Civil Division, and law clerk to the Honorable Robert L. Hinkle, U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Florida. 
 1. LEO TOLSTOY, WAR AND PEACE, 1202 (Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky, trans., 
2007). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Lisa G. Aspinwall et al., The Double-Edged Sword: Does Biomechanism Increase or 
Decrease Judges’ Sentencing of Psychopaths? 337 SCIENCE 846, 846 (2012). 
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predisposed him to violent crime.4  The study was loosely based on the 
sentencing of Stephen Anthony Mobley who, after his conviction for murder, 
argued he should be tested for a genetic mutation that might explain his crime.5  
In the study, a subset of the judges reviewed brain scans and expert testimony 
that the defendant’s criminal behavior was caused not by an act of volition, but 
by the chemical composition of his brain.6  The study, entitled The Double-
Edged Sword: Does Biomechanism Increase or Decrease Judges’ Sentencing of 
Psychopaths?, found that such evidence significantly affected the sentences 
those judges imposed.7 
The judges overwhelmingly found the evidence of a biomechanical cause of 
the crime to be a mitigating factor, leading to more lenient sentences when 
compared to the sentences imposed by judges presented with no such evidence.8  
The judges presented with evidence of the criminal’s mental predisposition 
imposed sentences that were, on average, 1.1 years shorter for the same crime.9  
Though the judges rated the criminal to have a high legal and moral 
responsibility and free will under both versions of the facts, the differing 
sentences suggest that the judges’ intuitions regarding the freedom of a 
criminal’s behavior played a significant role in their judgments concerning his 
blameworthiness.10  Confronted with evidence of aberrant brain composition, 
the judges presumably believed that the criminal’s act was less blameworthy 
because his free will was less than the average person’s.11 
The article’s reference to a “double-edged sword” denotes the potential that 
evidence like the kind presented in the study could influence judges in opposing 
directions concerning blameworthiness.12  From a retributive standpoint—
concerned with the proper deserts fitting a crime—evidence that the crime was 
caused by something other than the criminal’s free choice constitutes mitigating 
evidence.13  However, from a utilitarian standpoint—concerned with future 
dangerousness—a predisposition toward crime seems to weigh in favor of 
incarceration as a method of incapacitation.14  While this article focuses more 
on the retributive side of this equation, it is helpful to keep these countervailing 
concerns in mind.  The study makes clear that the judges’ convictions regarding 
                                                 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.; see also Mobley v. State, 455 S.E.2d 61, 65–66 (Ga. 1995). 
 6. Aspinwall, supra note 3, at 846. 
 7. Id. at 847–48. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 846 
 10. Id. at 847. 
 11. Id. at 847–48. 
 12. Id. at 846. 
 13. Id. at 848. 
 14. Id. 
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the blameworthiness of a criminal’s action is in some way tied to their judgments 
concerning his freedom of will.15 
This makes sense within the criminal law, since seldom is an action, referred 
to as the actus reus, alone sufficient to render an act criminal.16  To qualify as a 
crime, that act must be accompanied by a culpable mental state, called the mens 
rea.17  While questions of determinism may seem, at first blush, to involve the 
mens rea component of the criminal act, in actuality, much of the discussion of 
free will and determinism focuses on whether a certain act is voluntary.18  The 
Seventh Circuit underscored the essential nature of voluntariness in United 
States v. Cullen, when it noted: 
In the narrowest sense, every crime must be the product of defendant’s 
free will; it must reflect his choice to perform the criminal act.  If the 
act itself was the result of a mere reflex, or muscular spasm, or was 
caused by physical duress or compulsion, even the narrowest intent 
would be absent and the defendant would be innocent of crime; 
indeed, it could be said that he did not act at all.19 
There seems to be little room for disagreement that a spasm is neither a 
morally ascribable act, nor the ground for criminal sanction.  Scaling up from 
this intuitive truth, why shouldn’t the same be said of the acts of a person with 
an aberrant brain composition predisposing him to commit a crime?20  And if 
physical determinism is true, and all human actions are caused by forces outside 
of human control, then perhaps no human action is properly morally 
ascribable.21  This presents a considerable problem for the justification and 
administration of criminal punishments.22 
Defendants have often sought to inject the kind of causal arguments noted 
above into criminal trials—sometimes as a mitigating factor, sometimes as an 
affirmative defense, and sometimes to defeat the prosecution’s case-in-chief.23  
Such evidence appeals to a common moral intuition: it seems unjust to punish 
                                                 
 15. Id. at 847–48. 
 16. Ian P. Farrell & Justin F. Marceau, Taking Voluntariness Seriously, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1545, 
1548–49 (2013) (discussing the fundamental importance of both actus reus and mens rea to 
criminal culpability). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Luis E. Chiesa, Punishing Without Free Will, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1403, 1411–12 
(2011). 
 19. United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386, 390–91 (7th Cir. 1971). 
 20. See Mobley v. State, 455 S.E.2d 61, 65–66 (Ga. 1995) (discussing the defendant’s motion 
“seeking funds for expert witnesses to conduct preliminary testing . . . ‘suggest[ing] a possible 
genetic basis for violent and impulsive behavior in certain individuals.’”). 
 21. See Aspinwall, supra note 3, at 847. 
 22. See, e.g., Mobley, 455 S.E.2d at 66. 
 23. See Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1097 (1985); 
see generally Deborah W. Denno, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free Will or Free 
Ride? 137 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 616–17 (1988). 
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someone for a harm he did not cause, or one that was outside of his control.24  If 
a person’s criminal act is caused not by free choice, but by brain composition or 
the irresistible push of a strong gust of wind, it seems unlikely that a jury would 
hold such a person criminally liable—such an action is not morally ascribable to 
the actor.25  The study in Science seems to confirm such a belief is widespread 
amongst state court judges, who are responsible for much of criminal sentencing 
in the United States.26 
Though little in the Science study may be revolutionary,27 it elegantly raises 
the tension felt within the law between beliefs in physical determinism and in 
human free will.28  How can we punish a criminal who was predetermined by 
causes outside his control to commit a crime?29  Is such a person really 
blameworthy?  These questions implicate strong intuitions and have been 
debated for millennia.30  Going further, if showing that a criminal’s crimes are 
attributable, at least in part, to factors outside of his control leads to a lesser 
punishment, then what if science eventually demonstrates that all people are 
similarly determined by factors outside of their control?  Must the criminal law 
simply collapse, or perhaps take on a solely utilitarian cast, relinquishing any 
retributive basis?31  The purpose of this Article is to propose that, even granting 
incompatibility between hard physical determinism32 and a robust sense of 
human free will, the criminal justice system can be established on a footing that 
remains uncommitted to either alternative without being internally inconsistent. 
This debate thrusts into the arena of criminal law what Leo Tolstoy faced in 
the historical realm when he wrote in the concluding epilogue of War and Peace: 
If we examine a man alone, without his relation to everything around 
him, his every action appears free to us. But if we see at least some 
relation to what is around him. Is we see his connection with anything 
whatever—with the man who is talking to him, with the book he is 
reading, with the work he is doing, even with the air that surrounds 
him, even with the light that falls on things around him—we see that 
                                                 
 24. Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Choice, 
Character, and Responsibility, 67 IND. L. J. 719, 730–31 (1991–1992). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Aspinwall, supra note 3, at 847–48. 
 27. See Denno, supra note 23, at 633–39 (describing studies of neurophysiological 
abnormalities in criminals and their use in court). 
 28. See, e.g., Michele Cotton, A Foolish Consistency: Keeping Determinism Out of the 
Criminal Law, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 33–35 (2005). 
 29. The literature confronting this question is large and varied in its approach to the problem. 
See, e.g., Pillsbury, supra note 24, at 730. 
 30. See generally DERK PEREBOOM, FREE WILL vii–x (Derk Pereboom ed., 1997) (discussing 
historical background of the problem of free will and determinism) [hereinafter FREE WILL]. 
 31. Moore, supra note 23, at 1094 (suggesting, but ultimately rejecting such a scheme). 
 32. Aspinwall, supra note 3, at 846 (defining “biological determinism” as “the idea that once 
we know something about an individual’s genes or brain, we can predict or explain his or her 
behavior”). 
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each of these conditions has an influence on him and guides at least 
one side of his activity. And insofar as we see these influences, so far 
our notion of his freedom decreases and our notion of the necessity he 
is subject to increases.33 
If a human being is determined by events outside his control, and is not an 
independent actor, then how can we hold such a being responsible for his 
choices?  While many would argue that such an inconsistency is illusory,34 if we 
push that dispute aside and grant that there is no room for moral responsibility 
in a deterministic world, then what form should our system of criminal law take? 
This Article differs from those works that have proposed there really is no 
inconsistency between free will and determinism and that our legal system need 
not confront such problem because the problem itself is illusory.35  Nor does this 
article join those works that advocate accepting incompatibility between free 
will and determinism by instituting a moderated, but ultimately incoherent, 
system of criminal justice.36  Rather, this Article argues that, beginning from 
widely accepted notions of a right to self-defense, a criminal justice system can 
be fashioned from the concept of “weak retributivism” proposed by Daniel 
Farrell.37  This is a concept that is palatable to both those who believe in human 
free will to the exclusion of physical determinism and to those who believe in 
physical determinism to the exclusion of human free will.38  If it can cater to 
such “incompatibilists,”39 then such a system should also be acceptable to 
compatibilists, who believe that there is no true inconsistency between moral 
agency and physical determinism.40 
Part I of this Article briefly sketches the problem of free will and determinism 
as it relates to criminal punishment and discusses the discomfort many in the 
administration of the criminal law feel to physical determinism.  Part II examines 
the Durham test of insanity as an area where the conflict between free will and 
determinism has had a concrete impact on the criminal justice system.  Part III 
suggests an alternative ground for criminal punishment, based on Daniel 
Farrell’s “weak retributivism,”41 that can function regardless of whether humans 
have the free will required for moral responsibility.  Part IV presents a general 
outline of how such a system might look and how it might differ from our current 
                                                 
 33. TOLSTOY, supra note 1, at 1205. 
 34. See Peter Westen, Getting the Fly Out of the Bottle: The False Problem of Free Will and 
Determinism, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 599, 600–01 (2005). 
 35. See id. 
 36. See Cotton, supra note 28, at 5. 
 37. See Daniel M. Farrell, The Justification of General Deterrence, 94 PHIL. REV. 367, 368 
(1985). 
 38. DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL 1–3 (2001) [hereinafter LIVING 
WITHOUT FREE WILL]. 
 39. Id. at 1. 
 40. See Moore, supra note 23, at 1121. 
 41. See Farrell, supra note 37, at 368. 
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system of punishment.  Part V concludes with a look at how current theories of 
excuse might survive within such a system. 
Rather than arguing for a specific metaphysical account and constructing a 
system of criminal law that is compatible with that account, this Article seeks to 
propose a system of criminal law that is independent of the various accounts of 
free will and determinism noted throughout this paper.  This attempt is Rawlsian 
in its cast: the system suggested in this Article does not rely on robust notions of 
moral agency dependent on human free will.42  As Rawls sought to construct his 
political philosophy on as general a metaphysical grounds as possible,43 so too 
this Article seeks to explore a plausible system of justice consistent with equally 
plausible metaphysical theories.  This Article neither assumes nor argues for 
determinism.  Rather, it argues that, contrary to the widespread belief that any 
robust system of criminal justice must have as its presupposition human free 
will, the punishment of criminals can be justified without reliance on a picture 
of human free will subject to being undermined by a theory of physical 
determinism.  While this system must be grounded on some suppositions, they 
are of a general enough character to appeal to most plausible metaphysical 
accounts, which is as it should be.  In a pluralistic society such as ours, our 
institutions, including our institutions of justice, should be founded on the most 
widely acceptable, functional basis that can be found. 
I.  FOUNDATIONAL FREE WILL 
When Abraham Lincoln described the United States as a nation “dedicated to 
the proposition that all men are created equal,”44 he identified a proposition he 
believed foundational to American society.  Lincoln did not say all men are, in 
fact, created equal; rather, Lincoln identified the belief in and dedication to 
equality as essentially American.45  Fyodor Dostoevsky illustrated a similar 
dedication when he said, “[i]f anyone could prove to me that Christ is outside 
the truth, and if the truth really did exclude Christ, I should prefer to stay with 
Christ and not with truth.”46  Human equality was undermined by the institution 
of slavery, yet Lincoln nonetheless urged his countrymen to hold to equality to 
realize a more perfect Union.  Dostoevsky wrestled with doubt, and yet he 
resolved he would hold with his faith even if the object of his belief proved false. 
Within American jurisprudence, particularly within our system of criminal 
justice, there is a similar foundational belief that undergirds our system: the 
                                                 
 42. See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFFAIRS 223, 240 n.22 (1985). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Abraham Lincoln: Gettysburg Address, https://www.greatamericandocuments.com/spee 
ches/lincoln-gettysburg/, (last visited Feb. 19, 2018). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Letter from Fyodor Dostoevsky to Mrs. N.D. Fonvizin (1854) in Ethel Golburn Mayne, 
trans., LETTERS OF FYODOR MICHAILOVITCH DOSTOEVSKY TO HIS FAMILY AND FRIENDS 71, 67–
68 (1914). 
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belief in human responsibility and moral agency founded on an assumption that 
humans possess free will.  While there is much debate on the proper definition 
of free will,47 at its most stripped-down, it is a belief that humans are moral 
agents with the ability to guide their actions without being externally 
determined.48  As science has gained a wider and more comprehensive 
understanding of the physical world, arguments that humans are no more free of 
the laws of nature than a rock or tree have increased.49  Our world, the belief 
runs, is determined by physical laws and the state of physical matter at any given 
time; a complete picture of both would allow us to predict every future state of 
the universe, including human action.50 
American jurisprudence has resisted recognizing such physical determinism 
because of its possible consequences for criminal law.  Most people would find 
it absurd to hold a meteor that crashes into a home morally accountable for the 
destruction it wreaks.  Likewise, we look backward with puzzlement at the 
medieval practice of trying animals for crimes.51  But if humans, like rocks and 
animals, are simply prey to the laws of nature with no real autonomy, then why 
should we treat them any differently?  The retributive theories of punishment 
underlying our system support holding a person responsible for his actions just 
because he chose those actions, and threatens to fall apart if the law recognizes 
that human action is ordained by physical laws rather than a robust freedom of 
will. 
This fear, the fear of the collapse of the grounds for holding people criminally 
liable for their actions, can be seen rising to the surface of American 
jurisprudence within individual court opinions: 
                                                 
 47. See LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL, supra note 38, at 1–3 (exploring various historical 
definitions of free will); see generally FREE WILL, supra note 30, at vii–x (discussing historical 
background of the problem of free will and determinism). 
 48. THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 114-15 (1986).  Cf. FREE WILL, supra note 30, at 
233. 
[Free will] presents itself initially as the belief that antecedent circumstances, including 
the condition of the agent, leave some of the things we will do undetermined: they are 
determined only by our choices, which are motivationally explicable but not 
themselves causally determined.  Although many of the external and internal 
conditions of choice are inevitably fixed by the world and not under my control, some 
range of open possibilities is generally presented to me on an occasion of action—and 
when by acting I make one of those possibilities actual, the final explanation of this ... 
is given by the intentional explanation of my action, which is comprehensible only 
through my point of view.  My reason for doing it is the whole reason why it happened, 
and no further explanation is either necessary or possible.” 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 49. See Moore, supra note 23, at 1112–13. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Katie Sykes, Human Drama, Animal Trials: What the Medieval Animal Trial Can Teach 
Us About Justice for Animals, 17 ANIMAL L. 273, 276 (2011). 
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While philosophers, theologians, scientists and lawyers have debated 
for centuries whether such a thing as ‘free will’ really exists, society 
and the law have no choice in the matter. We must proceed, until a 
firm alternative is available, on the scientifically unprovable 
assumption that human beings make choices in the regulation of their 
conduct and that they are influenced by society’s standards as well as 
by personal standards.  We can, in the abstract, agree with Aquinas 
that man ‘the framer of human law, is competent to judge only the 
outward acts; 
* * *   God alone the framer of the divine law, is competent to judge 
the inward movement of wills.52 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia makes a 
suggestion reminiscent of Lincoln and Dostoevsky: it argues the courts must 
hold to the notion of free will, not until the debate is resolved once and for all, 
but “until a firm alternative is available.”53  This choice is pragmatic, reflecting 
not a deep-seated ideology, but rather a tactical choice that free will is a 
necessary condition for a working criminal justice system.54  In its decision, the 
court explicitly recognizes the dependence of our criminal system on the idea of 
free will.  Even in the face of proof that physical determinism is true, the courts 
must proceed on the assumption that free will exists until an alternative system 
of justice not predicated on such a belief can be fashioned. 
The United States Supreme Court has echoed the Blocker court in holding that 
“[a] ‘universal and persistent’ foundation stone in our system of law, and 
particularly in our approach to punishment, sentencing, and incarceration, is the 
‘belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the 
normal individual to choose between good and evil.’”55  Justice Benjamin 
Cardozo, writing for the Supreme Court, agreed: “Till now the law has been 
guided by a robust common sense which assumes the freedom of the will as a 
working hypothesis in the solution of its problems.”56  The fear of these courts 
was expressed succinctly by the D.C. Circuit when it wrote, “In the 
determination of guilt age old conceptions of individual moral responsibility 
cannot be abandoned without creating a laxity of enforcement that undermines 
the whole administration of criminal law.”57  The criminal law cannot give up a 
                                                 
 52. Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger, J., concurring). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 866 (quoting Gregg Cartage & Storage Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 74, 79–80 
(1942) (“[T]he practical business of government and administration of the law is obliged to proceed 
on more or less rough and ready judgments based on the assumption that mature and rational 
persons are in control of their own conduct.”). 
 55. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 52 (1978) (quoting Morrisette v. United States, 
342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952)). 
 56. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937). 
 57. Fisher v. United States, 149 F.2d 28, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1945). 
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belief in free will because the consequences would undermine the entire system, 
which seeks to hold individuals accountable for their criminal actions. 
Yet determinism has made inroads into American law, sometimes eliciting 
fierce reaction from courts.  The next Part of this Article will explore the insanity 
defense as an area of the law where physical determinism has impacted the 
practical application of our criminal system.  It will show the sometimes violent 
reactions of the legal system to encroachment by determinism, and will also 
suggest determinism is a problem likely to persist.  It would be better for our 
courts and the society they protect to overcome doubts about determinism by 
adopting a system not tied to robust conceptions of human free will. 
II.  DETERMINISM AT THE GATES 
The tension felt by American jurists between deterministic accounts of the 
universe, including human behavior, and the criminal law’s dedication to human 
freedom are not limited to theoretical debates in academic journals.  The debate 
has time and again reared its head in the opinions of cases decided, at least in 
part, on the basis of the metaphysical leanings of the judge in question.58  This 
Part focuses on the insanity defense as an area of law where determinism has 
had a profound impact.  Such an account will animate the search, explained in 
later Parts, for a system of criminal justice not vulnerable to determinism. 
In the middle of the twentieth century, a panel of judges on the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reevaluated the court’s test for 
criminal insanity.59  Monte Durham had been convicted at trial of 
housebreaking, and the trial judge had rejected Durham’s defense of insanity on 
the basis that the defense had failed to establish at trial that Durham “didn’t know 
the difference between right and wrong or that even if he did, he was subject to 
an irresistible impulse by reason of the derangement of mind.”60  Writing for the 
D.C. Circuit on review, Judge David Bazelon held that existing tests for insanity 
were obsolete and inadequate to the then-current understandings of the mental 
workings of the insane.61  The court went to great lengths to decry prevailing 
tests, specifically the “right-wrong test[,]” then in force in that circuit, and the 
“irresistible impulse” test referred to by the trial judge.62  In formulating a new 
test, the court looked to the test for insanity adopted in New Hampshire in 1870, 
which held “an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the 
product of mental disease or mental defect.”63  The Durham test, which clearly 
                                                 
 58. See generally Cotton, supra note 28, at 1. 
 59. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
 60. Id. at 864–65. 
 61. Id. at 869. 
 62. See id. at 869–74. 
 63. Id. at 874–75. 
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seems to imply mental disease can cause actions, rather than simply influencing 
the will of the criminal, would become an object of fierce contention.64 
Durham was controversial from the beginning, but a majority of the D.C. 
Circuit defeated a rehearing en banc which might have jeopardized the test.65  
Judge Warren Burger expressed his disapproval for the Durham test in later 
opinions, taking issue with the fact that Durham “assumed, without discussion, 
that mental disease can ‘produce’ or cause criminal acts.”66  The test “operated 
to reject the historic basis of criminal responsibility and to substitute something 
resembling the ‘determinist’ thesis that man’s conduct is simply a manifestation 
of irresistible psychological forces in which ethical and moral values and 
standards play a small part, if any part.”67  Burger bristled at the absence of any 
mention of a person’s capacity to make choices in the regulation of his behavior 
from the Durham test.68  That was the traditional standard for criminal insanity: 
whether a person was able to understand the criminal choice before him and able 
to see it was wrong and avoidable.69  The Durham test instead asked jurors to 
decide whether the act was directly caused by the mental disease.70 
Durham was overruled in 1972,71 but not before it effected a 36-fold increase 
in the number of successful insanity defenses in the D.C. Circuit.72  The 
deterministic flavor of Durham seems, empirically, to have had a clear effect on 
juries, given their increased willingness to acquit defendants when applying the 
test.73  Like the judges presented with evidence of biomechanical causes of a 
criminal’s actions, the jurors’ intuitions concerning moral blameworthiness 
similarly may have been softened when they focused on whether the insanity 
caused the criminal to behave as he or she did, rather than evaluating whether 
the criminal’s will was overcome by the mental disease.74  This seems to confirm 
Judge Bazelon’s own reasoning in adopting the Durham test—that the name we 
put to a failure does matter, as noted by the increase in acquittals following the 
Durham test75: 
Evil, of course, can only be punished or forgiven.  But illness is 
supposed to be ameliorated or cured.  Thus the name we put to our 
                                                 
 64. See Cotton, supra note 28, at 5–9. 
 65. Durham, 214 F.2d at 876. 
 66. Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger, J., concurring). 
 67. Id. at 867. 
 68. Id. at 865. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. (“When it came to explaining to the jurors the standards they were to use, we see that 
all reference to man’s capacity to make choices in regulating conduct or any connection between 
the power to make choices and criminal responsibility was carefully eliminated.”). 
 71. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc). 
 72. Cotton, supra note 28, at 8. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See Aspinwall, supra note 3, at 847–48. 
 75. Cotton, supra note 28, at 8. 
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failures makes a difference.  We all tend to believe in free will when 
we entertain hopes for the future, but switch to determinism when 
recalling our past failures.  I suggest we extend the same consideration 
to the failures of others.76 
When the emphasis is placed not on the criminal’s choice to commit a crime, 
but rather on the causal role a mental disease may have played in the crime, then 
intuitions concerning moral blameworthiness seem to diminish. 
If nothing else, the history of the Durham test shows that how we frame 
questions of human will and determinism have a profound practical impact on 
the application of the law.  It stands to reason, therefore, that a system which 
could accommodate determinism, as Justice Burger clearly felt that our current 
system cannot,77 would be less vulnerable to shifting beliefs favoring free will 
on the one hand and determinism on the other. 
III.  SELF-DEFENSE AND “WEAK RETRIBUTIVISM” 
Having attributed the apprehension felt within the criminal law to physical 
determinism, the question then becomes: can a system which can address the 
potential of determinism to undermine justifications for criminal punishment be 
developed?  Since it is exactly the belief in free will that determinism 
undermines, at least in the minds of many, the more specific project is to 
construct a system which does not rely on free will to measure culpability.78  
Although there is much room for debate on the compatibility of free will and 
determinism, assuming free will and determinism cannot coexist, is it possible 
to develop a system of justice satisfactory to both?  This Part considers what 
Daniel Farrell calls the concept of “weak retributivism” as the potential basis for 
such a system.79 
In his article The Justification of General Deterrence, Farrell develops a 
system of general deterrence he characterizes as a form of “weak retributivism,” 
which is based on a theory of distributive justice.80  While Farrell uses the 
example of self-defense against an unjust aggressor to develop this idea, Derk 
Pereboom argues that Farrell’s theory may be justified even without the 
existence of moral responsibility and free will and suggests extending Farrell’s 
theory to one that can exist in a physically determined world without free will.81  
Thus, Farrell and Pereboom, together, provide a plausible system of criminal 
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justice which can satisfy determinists, who believe the lack of human free will 
makes most criminal punishments unjustifiable, while simultaneously allaying 
the courts’ fears that abandoning free will and moral responsibility would be 
fatal to a robust system of criminal justice. 
Farrell’s approach to general deterrence is grounded in the individual right to 
both direct and indirect self-defense.82  Direct self-defense, as Farrell uses it, is 
a person’s right to inflict the amount of harm needed to stop an unjust aggressor 
from harming the victim in the face of a threat.83  Indirect self-defense is the 
individual’s right to threaten to inflict harm in order to prevent an unjust 
aggressor from harming the victim in the face of a threat.84  Farrell argues the 
intuition that such acts of self-defense are justified is founded on a notion of 
distributive justice.85  That is, if a harm is inevitable and we must choose whether 
to allocate it to an innocent victim or an unjust aggressor, then it seems right to 
allocate that harm to the unjust aggressor.86  Our criminal justice system already 
has this feature: it protects the innocent against the acts of the unjust aggressor, 
or criminal.  Yet it is Farrell’s next movements that provide a practical 
foundation to a system of general deterrence not dependent on the existence of 
free will. 
If our right to direct and indirect self-defense was limited to inflicting or 
threatening to inflict the minimum harm needed to prevent an unjust aggressor’s 
attack, then the application of this approach to a system of criminal justice where 
the criminal is already in custody and incapacitated would seem questionable.87  
Since the aggressor is no longer a threat, there does not seem to be any 
justification to punish the person any longer on the grounds of self-defense.88  
Self-defense, therefore, would be limited to cases of immediate danger, likely 
only in the province of individual citizens and perhaps the police in their role of 
protecting the innocent.89   Yet Farrell builds from our basic intuitions regarding 
self-defense to a society-wide system of criminal justice which, he believes, rests 
upon self-defense rather than more hard-to-defend notions of hard 
retributivism.90  Farrell notes the difference between his system as thus: 
And this, I shall say, is one version of the thesis of weak retributivism: 
one must suffer, once one has done wrong, not (simply) because of 
one’s decision to do wrong, as in classical or ‘fierce’ retributivism; 
rather, one must suffer if one’s decision to do wrong makes it 
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necessary that someone must suffer and that sufferer must either be 
the wrongdoer or some innocent victim.91 
Farrell distinguishes between special and general deterrence, defining the 
former as punishment inflicted to prevent the individual criminal from repeating 
his crime and the latter as punishment inflicted to prevent the population at large 
from committing the same type of crime or crimes in general.92  Special 
deterrence, to Farrell, is the easier practice to justify—he argues that special 
deterrence is really nothing more than the right of indirect self-defense exercised 
at a societal level.93  General deterrence is harder to justify on Farrell’s account, 
for how do we justify inflicting pain on an unjust aggressor when it is not to 
prevent that aggressor’s actions but to prevent the actions of society at large?94  
Unlike special deterrence, this practice seems unjustifiable on a theory of direct 
and indirect self-defense, for we are not seeking to defend ourselves from the 
aggressor’s actions, but rather, the feared actions of society at large.95  Why that 
burden should fall upon the criminal as opposed to any other person in society 
is not obvious at first blush. 
Farrell argues that a practice of general deterrence can be developed from our 
rights of direct and indirect self-defense.96  The justification hinges on the fact 
that when a person commits a crime, in addition to the harm of the crime itself, 
the criminal also harms society by making it more likely that others will commit 
acts of that same kind.97  If this vulnerability of society to a greater amount of 
crime is attributable to the actions of the criminal, then, Farrell argues, it is 
justifiable to inflict the amount of harm on the criminal needed to counter that 
vulnerability.98  This is just another aspect of the principle of distributive justice 
at work in special deterrence.99 
It is not immediately apparent how this system of self-defense based on 
distributive justice could be applied to society at large.  A person may have a 
right to defend against unjust aggressors, but why that right should motivate a 
penal system with the state as the distributor of punishment is unclear.  Yet even 
if the state could distribute punishments in this way, the principle of self-defense 
discussed would only allow the state to impose the punishment needed to protect 
society from the vulnerability introduced by the criminal’s actions.  If, as the 
almost-universal practice is amongst systems of criminal justice, uniform 
systems of punishment are developed and applied to criminals in different 
contexts, then this often may lead to criminals punished in excess of the amount 
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of harm justified on self-defense grounds.100  Farrell takes up this question, 
largely on grounds of administrability, and his discussion will become central to 
the next Part of this Article, which will examine the broad outlines of a system 
of criminal justice founded on Farrell’s principles.101 
Farrell maintains his system, based on a principle of distributive justice, is a 
form of what might be called “weak retributivism.”102  This is because “one’s 
wrongful choices make one liable, morally, to treatment to which one would 
ordinarily not be liable.”103  Thus, a criminal is liable to punishment because of 
his actions: the wrongdoer is simply receiving his deserts.  This approach to 
general deterrence has the benefit of avoiding the pitfall inherent in many 
utilitarian-based systems, as the system cannot justify punishing an innocent 
person even if such punishment would benefit society at large.104  This system 
of general deterrence, founded on common-sense notions of the right of self-
defense, only justifies punishing those who unjustifiably harm members of 
society or society as a whole.105 
Yet Farrell’s account is predicated on self-defense where the criminal is an 
unjust aggressor.106  His account “presupposes that the wrongdoer in question is 
both causally and morally responsible for [society’s] increased vulnerability to 
others’ wrongdoing.”107  His view, then, seems unavailable if we are searching 
for a basis for criminal justice not reliant on free will.  In Living Without Free 
Will, however, Derk Pereboom argues that Farrell’s principles can be put on a 
“hard incompatabilist” footing which rejects free will and accepts physical 
determinism.108 
Pereboom argues for the position of “hard incompatibilism” – the view that 
“freedom of the sort required for moral responsibility is incompatible with 
determinism” – because human actions and choices are determined by external 
forces.109  Though he finds some accounts of free will are coherent in 
themselves, Pereboom views the existence of free will as empirically unlikely.110  
After making the case for hard incompatibilism and rejecting the existence of 
moral responsibility, Pereboom turns to the consequences of such a view on 
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human life and institutions.111  In the context of criminal behavior, after ruling 
out retributivism as incompatible with determinism,112 Pereboom examines 
Farrell’s argument in The Justification of General Deterrence as a possible 
means of motivating a system of criminal justice.113 
It is not obvious, Pereboom argues, that the right to self-defense is triggered 
only by attacks by an unjust aggressor.114  Most of us would agree that a victim 
can defend himself from an attack whether the attacker is morally responsible or 
not —even if the attacker is compelled to attack, such as instances of 
psychopathy or involuntary movement.115  Of course, in such instances, the 
victim should inflict the minimum amount of harm needed to deter the threat, 
but this is just the system for which Farrell argues.116  Thus, if Pereboom is right 
and the right to self-defense is not dependent on the blameworthiness of an 
attacker, then everything Farrell has argued can be of use even if the attacker is 
not morally blameworthy for his actions.117  As Pereboom explains: 
[A] Farrell-style deterrence theory is grounded in the powerful moral 
intuitions that underlie the right to harm in self-defense.  Since – at 
least initially – this right would seem to be ours even if hard 
incompatibilism were true, it would appear that the hard 
incompatibilist could avail himself of Farrell’s theory in arguing for 
the legitimacy of criminal punishment.  Then he might not be at a 
disadvantage with respect to the competing positions in justifying an 
effective response to criminal behavior.118 
Thus Pereboom puts Farrell’s theory of general deterrence on a footing which 
can exist in a deterministic world.  Though Farrell developed his system on the 
grounds of punishing a morally blameworthy attacker, we see that his system 
can also justify punishing an attacker who is not morally blameworthy, or who 
lacks free will entirely.119  Beginning with the fundamental right of self-defense, 
one can fashion a system of general deterrence based not just on punishing to 
prevent the criminal from committing his crime again (special deterrence) but 
also on punishing to address the added vulnerability any criminal act contributes 
to society.  If we must choose between inflicting harm on society or a criminal 
(who is, by admission, not responsible for his crime), then we may choose to 
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inflict that harm on the criminal without thereby blaming him for his actions.120  
John Wigmore articulated a similar view in 1924: 
The measures of the modern penal law are not based on moral blame, 
but on social self-defense.  When there is a weed in your garden, and 
you cut it down, you do not do this on any theory of the moral blame 
of the weed, but simply on the theory that you are entitled to keep 
weeds out of your garden.  Society is entitled to use appropriate 
measures to repress antisocial acts.  Society’s right of self-defense is 
equally valid even when the human weed was predetermined by nature 
and environment to do just what he did.121 
Pereboom and Farrell, together, provide the basis for a system of criminal 
justice not dependent on free will.  We punish the criminal not because he is 
responsible for his actions, but because we must choose between a harm 
befalling the criminal or the society.  Part IV will explore a means of 
implementing a criminal justice system based on the system discussed here. 
IV.  THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE 
Part III explored a theory of criminal deterrence based on the right to self-
defense.  This Part will draw the broad outlines of how such a system might look 
in practice as an alternative to the current system of criminal punishment.  It 
begins by discussing how Farrell makes the movement from individual self-
defense to a society-wide regime of general deterrence.  It then turns to a 
discussion of how Farrell’s system can be adapted to a system free of moral 
blame and along the lines of Pereboom’s discussion in Living Without Free 
Will.122 
As noted in Part III, it is unclear how Farrell’s theory of general deterrence, 
founded as it is on the individual right of self-defense, could motivate a system 
of criminal justice where the state threatens to, and actually does, impose 
punishment to criminals for their actions when those criminals are already in 
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custody and, therefore, no longer pose an imminent threat to society.  If that 
system takes the form of a uniform schedule of punishments imposed for various 
crimes, it does not seem that Farrell’s system, which seems to require an 
individualized response to each criminal act, can be of aid.  Yet Farrell deals 
with both of these objections in turn, basing his answer in part on the more 
feasible administrability of a schedule of punishments than a system that 
individualizes punishments to individual cases.123 
Farrell deals with two branches of this objection separately: first, what 
justifies the state in threatening to punish people for certain classes of action, 
and second, what justifies the state in carrying out those punishments when a 
criminal commits one of the prohibited acts.124  In the first instance, Farrell’s 
argument is pragmatic.  He recognizes a uniform system of threats akin to a 
criminal code may be objected to on the grounds that it will often times threaten 
people more than is necessary to deter them from that crime.125  For instance, 
most of us, it seems, do not need the threat of the death penalty to deter us from 
murder.  Why, then, is the state justified in threatening us all in this way, rather 
than merely threatening those who are likely to commit murder but for the threat 
of punishment?  Farrell imagines a “very simple social setting” where it would 
be possible to issue specific threats of this sort.126  Yet in a large society like our 
own, the implementation of such a system would require us to “construct, at 
incalculable expense, an unimaginable bureaucracy that does nothing but issue 
particular threats to particular people.”127  The choice seems obvious: if we must 
issue general threats of punishment or face having no criminal code at all, Farrell 
argues it is reasonable to believe we are justified in issuing the general threats.128 
Assuming that individuals of a society have a general entitlement to be free 
from criminal activity, Farrell’s suggestion may be characterized as a preference 
for a liability rule of entitlement as it applies to criminal activity, rather than a 
property rule of entitlement.129  Calabresi and Melamed famously argued that 
liability rules—rules where “someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is 
willing to pay an objectively determined value for it”—are preferable in 
environments where fixing the value of an entitlement to its owner is either 
difficult or exceedingly costly.130  In the criminal context, ideally, the state 
would threaten each individual in society with only the amount of punishment 
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needed to deter that individual from crime; in reality, however, it would be 
extraordinarily cumbersome for the state to determine such individual values 
across society, even assuming a reasonably accurate method of measurement 
existed, and that seems unlikely.131  In such a case, therefore, it seems reasonable 
for the state to make a general estimate of the punishment needed to deter 
criminals and protect the entitlement.132  As Calabresi and Melamed note, 
“liability rules involve an additional stage of state intervention: not only are 
entitlements protected, but their transfer or destruction is allowed on the basis of 
a value determined by some organ of the state rather than by the parties 
themselves.”133  The generally issued threats proposed by Farrell are just this 
sort of state-determined, general estimate of the value of the cost of crime.134 
Farrell then turns to a justification for actually implementing the threatened 
punishments when a person commits one of the proscribed acts.135  Farrell notes 
that, at times, punishing a person according to the general threat may lead to a 
punishment that is greater than necessary to deter that criminal from behaving 
criminally in the future.136  This seems like improperly using the criminal for the 
good of society—something we want to avoid if we are to remain uncommitted 
to the moral blameworthiness of the criminal because it seems to imply the 
criminal is vulnerable to punishment of this kind because it is deserved.137  
Farrell’s response to this objection is to introduce his theory of general 
deterrence: we are justified in punishing the criminal above the amount needed 
to deter his criminal threat because someone, either the criminal or society at 
large, must bear the increased vulnerability to crime the criminal has introduced 
by his action.138  We are justified in punishing criminals according to the 
generally issued threats if society has established those punishments as an 
estimate of the amount of vulnerability the criminal act exposes to society.139 
Farrell proposes important limiting criteria which would stand as upper and 
lower limits on the amount of punishment that can rightly be dispensed under 
such a regime.140  First, Farrell argues an important limiting principle can be 
found in the fact that, because it is based on a theory of self-defense, his system 
only justifies doing no more “than we have to do in order to protect ourselves 
against the harms made likely by any given wrongdoer’s attack.”141  Thus, if a 
criminal threatens to or actually does commit a minor battery, most people 
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would not find that killing the attacker would be a proportionate response.142  
How punishments will be fitted to certain types of crimes under this principle is, 
for Farrell, an empirical matter estimating the harm that would be done to society 
at large by the criminal’s actions if punishment was not imposed.143  Such a 
determination may be difficult, and estimates of this kind may often seem 
capricious or arbitrary.  Yet fitting punishments to crimes is something our laws 
and courts regularly do, and it does not seem that such a determination would be 
any different than fixing the punishment a criminal “deserves” in our current, 
largely retributive system. 
The second limiting principle is more criminal-specific than crime-specific.144  
Though we may make efforts to estimate the harms differing classes of crimes 
impose upon society, the theory of self-defense is very context-specific.145  We 
are justified, on this theory, only in imposing the punishment necessary to 
prevent the harms stemming from the criminal’s actions; since, in most cases, 
the threat of actual harm will have passed by the time the criminal is punished, 
the courts will have to impose punishment commensurate with the needs of 
special and general deterrence.146  Farrell calls these “case-relative” limits “a 
posteriori” because they are not readily predictable: we can only divine the harm 
any criminal has done after he has done, or sought to do, that harm.147  We are 
again faced with the demand of tailoring every punishment imposed to the 
specific harm done by any particular criminal, and the “unimaginable 
bureaucracy” fears that Farrell discussed earlier in his article resurface.148 
Yet there seem to be two responses available to these a posteriori limits.149  
First, as Farrell suggests, if the right to self-defense is a right to do what is 
reasonably necessary to defend oneself and if requiring an individualized 
response rather than a society-wide schedule of penalties is unreasonable, then 
we seem to be justified in taking the reasonable step of normalizing the system 
of punishments across society based on a good-faith empirical estimate of the 
harms different types of crimes introduce.150  Second, it seems the ability to 
custom-tailor a punishment to the particular harm of a criminal’s action already 
exists within our system because of the discretion afforded to trial judges in 
sentencing.  The Science study demonstrates just this point: judges confronted 
with certain deterministic evidence at sentencing tended to find such evidence 
mitigating and to impose lesser sentences accordingly.151  While a harm-based 
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system of sentencing would need to be recalibrated to accord with our revised 
penalogical goals within this system, it does not demand anything not already in 
practice in our current justice system.152 
Introducing Pereboom’s interpretation of Farrell’s system at this point raises 
a very important question to be resolved if we are to rest our system upon 
Farrell’s weak retributivism: avoiding, as we are, that any person is morally 
responsible for his actions, how do we make room for defenses based on mental 
incapacity, infancy, compulsion, and the like?  These defenses have traditionally 
rested upon our intuitions regarding the degree of moral responsibility 
attributable to a person’s conduct.153  But if no one is morally responsible in this 
sense, then our traditional categories threaten to fall apart.  The reasoning of the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Freeman would seem to 
apply to every person: 
What rehabilitative function is served when one who is mentally 
incompetent and found guilty is ordered to serve a sentence in prison?  
Is not any curative or restorative function better achieved in such a 
case in an institution designed and equipped to treat just such 
individuals?  And how is deterrence achieved by punishing the 
incompetent?  Those who are substantially unable to restrain their 
conduct are, by definition, undeterrable and their ‘punishment’ is no 
example for others; those who are unaware of or do not appreciate the 
nature and quality of their actions can hardly be expected rationally to 
weigh the consequences of their conduct.  Finally, what segment of 
society can feel its desire for retribution satisfied when it wreaks 
vengeance upon the incompetent?  Although an understandable 
emotion, a need for retribution can never be permitted in a civilized 
society to degenerate into a sadistic form of revenge.154 
Under our theory, are all people not “substantially unable to restrain their 
conduct” if that conduct is determined not by a will that is free, but by physical 
laws working toward predictable and unavoidable outcomes?155 
The discussion of the insanity defense above serves as a valuable proxy for 
our discussion here.156  Alan Stone argues the “involuntariness” of the insane 
person’s actions is what makes him morally blameless.157 
We can readily acquiesce to this view of insanity and moral culpability 
without undermining our system, for we are not punishing the criminal because 
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he is culpable, but only because we choose, as a matter of societal self-defense, 
to harm the criminal rather than have that harm be borne by society at large.158  
Yet retaining defenses like insanity seems important even if we are discarding 
the notion of free will as the animating basis of our criminal justice system.  How 
can we effectively differentiate the insane person from those we would punish 
on our account? 
V.  EXCUSING EXCUSES 
As suggested in the previous Part, an obvious difficulty for a system based on 
weak retributivism is how to maintain the division between those who are 
punished for their crimes and those who are excused because of some mitigating 
factor.  One common means of differentiation is between those acts chosen (or 
caused) by the criminal versus those caused by factors outside of the criminal’s 
control; this is unavailable to us, however, if we are to avoid assuming free 
will.159  If we are to avoid running afoul of determinism at this point, we cannot 
base our system of excuse on the causal origins of a crime, for every action of 
the criminal is caused by external factors outside of his control.160  This presents 
a difficulty because, at least at a superficial level, many of the excuse defenses 
within the criminal law seem founded on the very notions of free will that we 
are seeking to avoid.161 
The excuses, and our general conceptual framework for attributing blame in 
American law, generally adhere to a causal model of responsibility.162  On a 
causal account, we distinguish acts that may appear criminal but are caused by 
unchosen influences on the accused person from crimes that are chosen and 
fairly attributable to the criminal.163  Excuses like duress, necessity, addiction, 
insanity, and infancy all seek to divide actions of a criminal nature from those 
caused by outside or alien influences on a person.164  The Durham test, while 
controversial for seeming to assume physical determinism, adhered to this view 
of crime, asking whether the criminal act was caused by the criminal or by his 
mental disease.165  Acts caused by forces outside the control of the actor cannot 
be criminal because they are not properly morally ascribable to the actor.166  And 
if an act is not morally ascribable to a person, it would be inappropriate to punish 
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the person for that act.167  H.L.A. Hart describes this free will grounding of our 
system of justice: 
[M]ost lawyers, laymen and moralists, considering the legal doctrine 
of mens rea and the excuses that the law admits, would conclude that 
what the law has done here is to reflect, albeit imperfectly, a 
fundamental principle of morality that a person is not to be blamed for 
what he has done if he could not help doing it.  This is how Blackstone 
at the beginning of modern legal history looked at the various excuses 
which the law accepted.  He said they were accepted because ‘the 
concurrence of the will when it has its choice either to do or avoid the 
act in question’ is the only thing that renders human actions 
praiseworthy or culpable.168 
Such an account runs afoul of our system, for it seems to rest criminal liability 
on whether an act is causally ascribable to an actor’s free choice.169  This means 
of differentiating culpable criminal acts from those which are excused cannot be 
made on the assumption that all actions are externally determined.170  While the 
causal model is not itself inconsistent with physical determinism, it threatens to 
excuse all crime.171  For if all crimes caused by external factors are excused, and 
we concede the determinist’s point that all human behavior is caused by external 
factors, then it seems to follow that all acts should be excused from 
punishment.172  If our system is to withstand deterministic accounts of human 
behavior and still punish some crime, then it must find an alternative means of 
excusing crime—a workable picture of the causal account rests on free will 
assumptions inconsistent with our system.173 
In addition to the practical disadvantages of the causal model, there are 
independent reasons to doubt its accuracy in describing the legal excuses.  As 
Michael Moore argues in his work Causation and the Excuses, the causal model 
does not fit as a theory of legal excuse.174  Moore makes this point using the 
example of duress.175  No jurisdiction, Moore argues, has adopted a test of duress 
that merely asks whether an external threat caused the person to act in a criminal 
matter.176  Rather, the test always ties the excuse of duress to whether a 
reasonable person would have been overcome by the threat.177  The focus, 
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therefore, is on whether the practical reasoning faculties of the threatened person 
were compromised by the threat, not whether the threat caused the crime 
(whatever that might mean).178  The causal model is over-inclusive as an account 
of the excuse of duress.179 
This is apparent if we return to the Durham test.  While the Durham test was 
cast in terms of the causal role played by the mental disease, the true issue in any 
insanity defense is whether the rational capacities of the person affected were so 
compromised that the person lacked the capacity to make a reasoned choice.180  
Moore argues that no matter what tests may be applied, the test for insanity, as 
applied by testifying mental health experts and by juries, focuses not on a causal 
account of the crime but rather on whether the person afflicted could make a 
reasoned decision at the time of the act.181  Thus, in addition to being undermined 
by determinism,182 an account of the excuses that turns on the causal model fails 
to accurately capture the rationale exercised in excusing a crime.183 
What is really at the heart of our theories of excuse is a determination of 
whether the accused was capable of exercising a rational choice free of 
coercion.184  Evidence of insanity, of duress, or other coercive or influencing 
factors only serves to establish that a person’s rational faculties were 
compromised in a way that excuses.185  Moore sums this view up, writing, “[i]n 
one or another of these ways, our legal and moral excuses all reflect the moral 
judgment that responsibility can only be ascribed to an individual who has both 
the capacity and the opportunity to exercise the practical reasoning that is 
distinctive of his personhood.”186  Focusing on the human rational faculty, which 
is not subject to doubt in the same way as the human capacity for free will, such 
an account of excuse is not undermined by determinism in the way that the 
causal model was.187 
This method of accounting for excuse is also coherent with the system 
described above, resting, as it does, on notions of self-defense and a general 
system of punishments that seeks to deter criminal activity.188  While no one 
may bear moral responsibility, given Farrell’s understanding of general 
deterrence, there is nothing inconsistent in excusing some harmful acts because 
the actor’s rational faculties were compromised at the time of their criminal 
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activity.189  The focus is not on whether the person’s actions were caused by 
external factors, for it may well be that all actions are so caused.190  Rather, we 
ask whether, in making his decision, the actor was possessed of the rational 
faculties requisite for considered human choice.191  Since a person who lacks 
rational capacity does not seem deterrable, if such faculties were compromised 
or absent, then we excuse that actor from punishment.192  This distinction may 
not bear the deep moral resonance that causal accounts bear, but it is not 
threatened by a widespread belief in physical determinism in the ways that a 
causal account is.193 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Beginning from an account of the universal right to self-defense, a system of 
general deterrence can be constructed that does not require belief in free will.194  
Such a view is compatible with a belief in physical determinism, even a physical 
determinism that precludes free will and, consequently, blameworthiness for 
crime.195  Such a system punishes the criminal not because he deserves to be 
punished in a moral sense, but because the negative effects of the crime must 
either rest with the criminal or with society itself.196  Society may choose, on 
this account, to deter crime through the punishment of criminal acts.197  Upon 
this general scheme, an account of excuse can be constructed that depends not 
on the causal origins of the crime, but on whether the criminal was possessed of 
his rational faculties at the time the criminal act was committed and was not 
coerced in the decision to perform the criminal act.198  Such a theory of excuse 
logically fits with our general theory of excuse, perhaps more aptly than the 
causal model,199 and can be justified on the grounds that there seems little benefit 
in attempting to deter those who chose a crime in a moment of coercion or during 
the loss of rational faculties. 
Consciousness of free will or its absence has a peculiar character: though it 
changes nothing about our world, it changes everything about how we perceive 
that world.  Even if society grants that there is no free will, the individuals 
composing that society will continue to behave as though they are free.  They 
will weigh options in making rational choices which will then motivate their 
actions, all the while knowing that they are not the “author” of those actions.  In 
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this way the problem of free will is much like the problem of absurdity: even if 
society admitted that human existence is, ultimately, meaningless, and that the 
seriousness with which the individuals in that society engage in our lives is 
absurd, individuals would continue to engage in their lives in a serious way.  
Albert Camus believed that confronting the question of absurdity was 
inextricably linked to the question of suicide: if human beings are absurd and 
cannot escape such a state in living, why not escape living entirely?200  Yet other 
philosophers, Thomas Nagel amongst them, have argued that recognizing our 
absurdity need not lead to such an extreme outcome: it should give way instead 
to a humble irony in our approach to life.201  After the recognition of absurdity, 
the whole color of life will change, even as it remains much the same in action.202 
The apprehension that courts feel towards determinism can be akin to 
Camus’s fear concerning the absurd; the courts believe accepting determinism 
would mean suicide for criminal justice.203  Yet such a calamitous outcome 
hardly seems necessary.  Rather than resist determinism, as courts have done,204 
we can attempt to mediate the divide between free will and determinism by 
developing a criminal justice system that depends on neither.  While this work 
has been cursory and the issues constituting this debate are manifold, this Article 
modestly attempts to suggest a foundation for criminal justice free of the 
ideological underpinnings that are threatened by a widespread acceptance of 
physical determinism.  I do not wade into the controversy between those who 
believe in human free will and those who do not; I merely address an issue that 
must be addressed in either case: what do we do about criminal behavior in our 
society? 
Our courts defend the rights of the many against the aggressions of the few.  
This role is indispensable in an ordered society.  Yet if our courts turn from the 
work of punishing the criminal as a wrongdoer and simply look to inflict the 
punishment needed both to deter the criminal from further crime and to 
safeguard society from the vulnerability that criminal activity creates, we can 
continue effective criminal punishment free of the nagging fear that a criminal, 
like a meteor or a tree, is just a product of his environment and should not be 
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